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Abstract
Can non-EU member states influence the EU’s energy policy? The Europeanization of energy policy in third countries is
often described as a one-directional process in which these countries essentially adopt the EU energy acquis. Our article
questions this dominant view by exploring whether and how third countries can influence the formulation and implemen-
tation of EU energy policy. We argue that relative differences in third country influence depend on their access to relevant
venues and actors of EU policy-making as well as their structural power resources. We develop a typology linking these
two factors to the outsider, follower, challenger, or shaper roles that third countries assume in EU energy governance. We
empirically probe our argument in three case studies representing different models of EU–third country cooperation. Our
cases include a group of nine Southeast and East European countries (Energy Community), Switzerland (bilateral arrange-
ments), and Norway (European Economic Area). The analysis shows that it is access and structural power which together
define the extent to which third countries are able to influence the formulation of EU energy policy and customize its
implementation to their domestic needs. We find that while the Energy Community members are followers in EU energy
governance, Switzerland and Norway are shapers. Strikingly, the influence of these two non-EU members may occasion-
ally even surpass that of smaller EU member states. This highlights that third countries are not merely downloading EU
energy regulation but sometimes also succeed in uploading their own preferences. Our contribution has implications for
the post-Brexit EU–UK energy relations and qualifies claims about EU regulatory hegemony in the wider region.
Keywords
Brexit; Energy Community; energy policy; European Economic Area; European Union; Europeanization; influence; Norway;
Switzerland; third country
Issue
This article is part of the issue “EU Energy Policy: Towards a Clean Energy Transition?”, edited by Kacper Szulecki and Dag
Harald Claes (University of Oslo, Norway).
© 2019 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Can, and if so how, do non-members influence EU energy
policy? Brexit has placed third country relations with the
European Union (EU) in the spotlight. In the area of en-
ergy, different institutional arrangements for coordina-
tion between the EU and third countries exist, and these
relationships are dynamic. For many years, Switzerland
and the EU have been negotiating to extend their bilat-
eral relations to an electricity agreement. Norway is a
member of the European Economic Area (EEA) which in-
volves dynamic cooperation in the sense that relevant
EU energy laws are incorporated as they arise. Further-
more, the Energy Community (EnC), a multilateral frame-
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 152–164 152
work between nine Southeast and East European coun-
tries and the EU to integrate their energy markets, is un-
dergoing a reform process. Common to each of these
relationships is the growing entanglement between EU
and national policies, a process that EU scholarship refers
to as ‘Europeanization’ (cf. Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse,
2001). This entanglement can generally work in two di-
rections; studies show how the EU influences member
state policies and vice versa (cf. Featherstone & Radaelli,
2003). Yet, Europeanization in energy relationswith third
countries is often described as a one-directional process
where such countries adopt or “download” the EU en-
ergy acquis (i.e., the EU’s accumulated legislation, legal
acts, and court decisions relevant for the area of energy).
The diffusion of EU regulation and norms beyond its ex-
ternal borders is held to exemplify the Union’s regulatory
and market power (Goldthau & Sitter, 2015). This article
seeks to advance the study of Europeanization of energy
policy and third countries through a closer examination
of the dynamics of third-country influenceor “uploading”
in EU energy governance.
We depart from the assumption that the relation-
ship between the EU and third countries in the energy
field is more nuanced than generally portrayed. Putting
academic contributionswith an EU-centric approach into
perspective, we argue that third countries can indeed in-
fluence EU energy policy. However, third countries are
not a homogeneous category but differ significantly in
their ability to upload their preferences to the EU level.
We explain relative differences in influence with refer-
ence to two variables: Third countries’ access to venues
and actors of EU policy-making (or lack thereof), and
their structural power resources. Whereas access is a
necessary precondition to creating channels of influence,
structural power resources provide the political weight
to utilize these channels. This differentiation accounts for
variation in influence among countries that are subject to
similar institutional relationships with the EU. Since we
include structural power, we move beyond the purely in-
stitutionalist focuswhich characterizes this research field
(cf. Godzimirski, 2019; Jegen 2009; Marcus et al., 2017).
Our contribution is to explain the influence of third coun-
tries on EU energy policy as a function of two indepen-
dent, yet intrinsically related variables.
The article proceeds in four steps. First, we review
the literature on Europeanization in light of external and
energy policy and develop a framework of third-country
influence in EU energy governance. Second, we probe
our arguments in three qualitative case studies, which in-
clude data from 15 interviews with experts from the EU
and third countries. The cases represent different mod-
els of third-country institutional relations with the EU.
They include a group of nine Southeast and East Euro-
pean countries (contracting parties of the EnC), Switzer-
land (bilateral arrangements with the EU), and Norway
(member of the EEA). Third, we discuss the implications
of our findings for differences in third country influence
and for future research on Europeanization. Finally, we
conclude by reviewing the implications of our main argu-
ments for future EU–UK relations.
2. A Framework of Third Country Roles in EU
Energy Policy
Since the late 1980s, European integration has made ac-
celerated progress in the area of energy (Buchan, 2015;
Thaler, 2016). As the Union’s involvement grew inter-
nally, so did the influence on energy sectors beyond
its territory. Arguably, the establishment of an internal
energy market and national targets for renewable en-
ergy sources have had most impact on the energy policy
of third countries. Physical interconnectedness of elec-
tricity grids and pipeline systems, participation in the
internal energy market, and the definition of common
goals for renewable energy sources required coordina-
tion and approximation of rules—not only within the EU
but also between the EU and third countries (cf. Buschle,
2014). Developments such as these have caused an in-
creasing entanglement between EU and national levels
of policy-making.
Academic research has captured the gradual expan-
sion of supranational consequences and the underlying
reciprocal dynamics between the EU and member state
policies under the concept of ‘Europeanization’ (Cowles
et al., 2001; Goetz & Hix, 2000). While scholars em-
phasize different mechanisms of how European and na-
tional levels influence one another, broad agreement ex-
ists around the bi-directional nature of Europeanization
(cf. Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Olsen, 2002). On one
hand, it is described as a top-down process of national
adaptation, whereby formal and informal rules, proce-
dures, and norms of the EU policy process cause a reori-
entation of domestic politics and policy-making (Börzel &
Risse, 2002; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). Addressees of this
mechanism of ‘downloading’ can be EU member states
(causing central penetration of national systems of gov-
ernance) as well as non-members (causing changes out-
side the EU’s external border). On the other hand, Euro-
peanization is a bottom-up and horizontal process of na-
tional projection, whereby domestic preferences, mod-
els, and ideas are lifted to the supranational level or
transferred to other national levels (Börzel, 2002). At the
EU level, this mechanism of ‘uploading’ typically leads to
the development of new institutions, new policies, and
capacity building.
Contributions on Europeanization of third countries
in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood or the wider re-
gion generally focus on top-down processes (Börzel,
2011; Gawrich, Melnykovska, & Schweickert, 2010;
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Subotic, 2011).
They share an implicit assumption that the EU is the dom-
inant partner in the relationship. As a result, the diffu-
sion of norms and regulations occurs mainly from the EU
to the third countries. The same pattern can be seen in
the field of energy policy, where the EU is typically per-
ceived as a regulatory and market power (Goldthau &
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Sitter, 2015, 2019) exporting its model of energy gover-
nance. Consequently, the EU energy acquis is expanded
beyond Union territory.
This article departs from an EU-centric approach by
investigating the possibilities which exist for third coun-
tries to shape EU energy policy. Hereby, we focus on Eu-
ropean rather than other multilateral policy processes,
such as global climate or trade negotiations. The main
argument is that the relationship between the EU and
third countries in the energy field is more nuanced than
generally portrayed: while third countries are not repre-
sented in EU decision-making, including on energy, they
might still play a role in shaping EU policies. This article in-
vestigates third country influence as the ability to shape
EU energy policy in line with own preferences (Dür, 2008,
p. 561). Influence is exercised at two different stages of
the policy cycle: Before (ex-ante) the conclusion of an EU
legal act, third countries may seek participation in policy
discourses that shape agenda setting and policy formula-
tion (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, p. 413). After (ex-post) the
conclusion of an EU legal act, third countries may be re-
quired to implement it. Like EUmembers, third countries
may customize their implementation of the EU energy ac-
quis by tailoring it to domestic needs (Thomann, 2015).
However, unlike EU countries, the terms of domestic im-
plementation will usually be subject to negotiations with
the EU. Flexible instruments may provide some leeway
in this process. The outcome of this process can be con-
sidered a form of policy influence because it shapes the
overall effects of EU energy policy by defining its geo-
graphic boundaries. While recent research has started to
describe specific elements of third-country influence (cf.
Godzimirski, 2019), this article seeks to offer a more sys-
tematic account: What enables third countries to shape
EU energy policy ex-ante or ex-post?
We argue that the relative influence of different third
countries on EU energy governance depends on two
main factors: their access to relevant venues and actors
of EU energy policy-making, and their structural power
resources. Access to relevant venues and actors of EU
energy policy-making may be formal or informal. For-
mal channels include all frameworks and specific arrange-
ments (e.g., member or observer status) that institution-
alize access to six European institutions and bodies with
energy governance functions (e.g., via their boards, com-
mittees, andworking groups): the Commission, the Coun-
cil, the European Parliament, the Agency for the Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators (ACER), and the European
Network of Transmission SystemOperators for Electricity
(ENTSO-E) and Gas (ENTSO-G). We include ACER and the
ENTSOs because the EU’s Third Energy Package has pro-
vided themwith important legalmandates in the comple-
tion of the internal energymarket, including the develop-
ment of market and network operation rules, infrastruc-
ture plans, and adequacy forecasts. Informal access de-
notes all contacts with relevant decision-makers outside
the six institutions mentioned above, including through
participation in loose political forums or ad hocmeetings.
The structural power resources of third countries can
turn access into influence. We focus on the role of struc-
tural power in adding weight to preferences and argu-
ments of third countries regarding EU policy-making in
the areas of electricity and gas. To the extent that third
countries implement EU legislation, structural power im-
pacts their ability to customize it, i.e., to negotiate for
adjustments and exemptions as well as to make full
use of flexible provisions. We thus apply a broader un-
derstanding of customization compared with Thomann
(2015) since we include the negotiated aspect of ex-post
incorporation, which is relevant when analyzing third
countries. Third countries can gain structural power be-
cause of physical interdependencies with the EU. Schol-
ars have noted that energy import dependencies of the
EU can create political leverage for its suppliers, such
as Norway and Russia (Godzimirski, 2019, pp. 106–107).
This is arguably an important source of power, despite
the fact that demand sensitivities can somewhat limit
the political leverage of energy producers (Casier, 2011,
pp. 497–500).
We posit, however, that the sources of structural
power in the energy sector are more diverse (Strange,
1994, pp. 24–42). Besides acting as a major energy sup-
plier, there are three more sources measured by sev-
eral indicators (Table 1). First, third countries can serve
as transit countries for energy supplies and flows. The
extent to which third countries can assume powerful
transit functions depends on their geographical location,
physical grid integration, and competitive position in
relation to alternative supply routes (cf. Casier, 2011,
p. 496; Haghighi, 2007). Second, third countries can
serve as knowledge hubs and technology leaders. Mul-
tiple state and non-state actors, including national regu-
latory authorities, transmission system operators (TSOs),
utilities, renewable energy companies, and research in-
stitutions, can provide valuable expertise which there-
fore grants access to EUdecision-makers (Bouwen, 2004).
Third, non-EU countries with flexible energy sources
and highly interconnected grids can serve as flexibility
providers. The rapid surge of renewable energies has
increased the demand for flexible supply options. Hy-
dropower and gas contribute to supply-side flexibility,
and robust, well-designed transmission grids help bal-
ance local supply-demand differences (Lund, Lindgren,
Mikkola, & Salpakari, 2015, pp. 797–798). Overall, these
sources of structural power play out in many facets of EU
electricity and gas policies, including security of supply,
infrastructure, internal market, and environment and cli-
mate change.
The greater the number of such indicators we can
detect within a country—both in terms of quantity
and quality—the higher its structural power. While all
sources of power matter, we acknowledge that being a
large supplier of energy to the EU stands out and may
compensate for a lack of other sources. Although concep-
tually distinct, the relationship between structural power
resources and access to relevant venues and actors of
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Table 1. Structural power resources in the energy sector.
Source of Structural Power Indicators
Energy supplies • Oil, gas, and electricity supplies
Transit Country • Strategic location in supply corridor
• Interconnectedness of grid
• Limited alternative supply routes
Expertise • Level of technical knowledge
• Experience
• Numbers of energy staff in missions to the EU
Flexibility provider • Installed hydro and gas capacity
• Natural gas production
• Storage capacity
• Number and capacity of grid interconnectors
Note: Compiled by the authors.
EU energy policy is complex. Disentangling it would ex-
ceed the scope of this article, but we acknowledge that
at times the two variables may interact and facilitate one
another. Figure 1 illustrates third country influence as we
conceptualize it in this article.
Departing from the above conceptualization, we dis-
tinguish four ideal-typical roles of third countries in EU
energy governance (Table 2). Relative to other third coun-
tries, shapers influence EU policy formulation and imple-
mentation because of their access and high structural
power. Institutionalized relations may require third coun-
tries to implement the EU energy acquis but also pro-
vide for formal or informal access to EU policy delibera-
tions. Structural power resources allow them to use this
access to shape EU policies. The role of shapers thus










Figure 1. Schematic illustration of third-country influence on EU energy policy. Note: Compiled by the authors.
Table 2. Typology of third countries in EU energy governance.
Third Country Access
Absent Present
Third Country Structural Power Resources High Challengers Shapers
Low Outsiders Followers
Note: Compiled by the authors.
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cies as well as the uploading of own preferences to the
European level. Followers also have strong institutional
links with the EU but lack significant structural power re-
sources. That is why followers cannot use their access to
influence EU policies. Hence, their relationship with the
EU primarily consists of downloading rather than upload-
ing. In contrast to shapers and followers, challengers and
outsiders have virtually no institutional access to the EU
and are not obliged to implement the EU energy acquis.
Challengers are third countries possessing high structural
power vis-à-vis the EU usually because of their supply
or transit functions. As they lack formal access to EU
policy processes, their influence will mainly materialize
through informal channels and in the context of “high”
politics. Outsiders lack the structural power resources of
challengers. Accordingly, they have no tangible influence
on EU energy policy development.
These ideal type categorizations are admittedly
rather coarse. Additional factors may come to shape EU–
third country energy relations. They include the simi-
larity of norms of the EU and third countries, mutual
economic interests, and the conditionality of EU invest-
ments in energy infrastructures abroad (Lavenex, 2004,
p. 693; Prange-Gstöhl, 2009, pp. 5300–5302). Neverthe-
less, our typology is a useful heuristic for understand-
ing the basic configurations of EU–third country relations
in energy governance because it facilitates a systematic
comparison of third-country influence. Conceptualizing
third country influence on EU energy policy as a function
of access and structural power resources, we add a novel
nuance to the current frameworks. Notably, we allow for
variation across countries that exhibit comparable levels
of access, yet different structural power resources, and
vice versa.
3. Case Studies of Third Country Influence on EU
Energy Policy
To answer the research question of how third countries
can influence EU energy policy, we investigate the role of
access in combination with structural power resources.
Our analysis includes three cases, each of which repre-
sents a different model of cooperation between the EU
and third countries: the EnC, Switzerland, and Norway.
The EnC is an international organization created by a
sectoral multilateral agreement. Today, it is made up of
the EU (represented by the European Commission) and
nine contracting parties: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Kosovo,Macedonia, Georgia,Moldova,Montenegro,
Serbia, and Ukraine. Switzerland is part of the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) and has defined its political rela-
tions with the EU in bilateral agreements. Because these
agreements currently do not cover energy, Switzerland
autonomously adapts to EU energy legislation and relies
on case-by-case arrangements for access to EU gover-
nance venues. Norway is also a member of EFTA and, in
addition, a part of the EEA (the other members being Ice-
land and Liechtenstein). As a comprehensivemultilateral
agreement, the EEA Agreement covers energy amongst
other issues. In a structured comparison, we probe our
expectation that the EnC countries generally act as fol-
lowers, whereas Switzerland and Norway are shapers in
EU energy policy. The analysis rests on a review of aca-
demic and public sources, as well as 15 semi-structured
interviews with experts from the EU and national, public,
and private organizations.
3.1. Energy Community: A Follower with New Demands
Coming into force in 2006, the EnC aims at creating a pan-
European energy market based on EU rules. Contracting
parties commit to adopt and apply core parts of the EU
energy acquis in their domestic legal systems. Due to le-
gal approximation in the energy field and a close insti-
tutional relationship with the EU, the form of integra-
tion has been described as an example of sectoral mul-
tilateralism (Blockmans & Vooren, 2012; Petrov, 2012).
However, despite an institutional structure designed for
the dynamic expansion of the EnC legal framework, the
contracting parties have access neither to relevant EU
decision-making processes (in the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament) nor to ACER. Only five of their electric-
ity TSOs aremembers of ENTSO-E (those fromBalkan EnC
parties apart from Kosovo) and five gas TSOs have ob-
server status in ENTSO-G (those fromAlbania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine). More-
over, they do not participate in key forums of EU en-
ergy policy (such as the Madrid or Florence Forums).
Their contact with the Commission is confined to the
EnC Ministerial Council where they cannot influence EU
policy-making (Interview K, L). Compared to EU member
states which can upload their preferences through all of
these channels to the European level, EnC contracting
parties, therefore, have only a very limited (if not vir-
tually non-existent) voice in future rule-setting (Prange-
Gstöhl, 2009, p. 5299). This imbalance renders the EU law
export to the EnC a legal one-way street.
Regarding structural power resources, EnC countries
present a differentiated picture. Their electricity sectors
play a minor role in electricity trading because they are
relatively small (Balkans andMoldova), partly unsynchro-
nized (Ukraine), or disconnected from other contract-
ing parties (Georgia). With a combined maximum hydro
capacity of 8.6 GW (54% of Swiss hydro capacity), the
Balkan EnC members provide some flexibility to the grid
of Continental Europe (EnC, 2018; Swiss Federal Office
of Energy [SFOE], 2018a). Ukraine is an important transit
country for natural gas fromRussia. Around 20% of EU to-
tal gas imports pass through its territory, making it a key
partner for the security of supply (European Commission,
2018). In this respect, the roles of Albania and Georgia
may be enhanced once the SouthernGas Corridor is com-
pleted and passes through their territories (Petrov, 2012,
p. 337). With few exceptions (Serbia has gained some
reputation within ENTSO-E), technical expertise and re-
sources are reportedly less developed across contracting
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parties (Interview K, L). Overall, aside from Ukraine’s po-
sition in gas transit, individual structural power resources
of the contracting parties are therefore negligible.
The individual and collective ex-ante influence of con-
tracting parties on the evolution of the EU energy acquis
has been largely insignificant. Individually, they rarely
make use of informal channels due to a lack of resources,
capacity, and access. Their TSOs experience similar is-
sues in ENTSO-E, resulting, for instance, in a passive
role in the Network Code drafting process (Interview K).
Collectively, their record for collaboration remains poor
despite an institutional framework that is conducive to
joint lobbying. Rather to the contrary, initiatives for con-
certed action occasionally proposed by the EnC Secre-
tariat are often opposed by the contracting parties (Inter-
view F, L). Reasons include diverse energy market struc-
tures resulting in heterogeneous interests. For instance,
electricity generation is dominated by hydro (Albania,
Montenegro, and Georgia), coal (Kosovo), or gas capac-
ity (Moldova), while Ukraine is the only contracting party
with nuclear power (EnC, 2018). Moreover, countries
which have a concrete perspective for EU accession (the
Western Balkans) tend to avoid conflictive behaviour vis-
à-vis the European Commission (Buschle, 2014; Prange-
Gstöhl, 2009). Finally, ethnic tensions still politicize tech-
nical cooperation on the Balkans. Repercussions are oc-
casionally experienced across Europe, as in the case of
a conflict between Serbia and Kosovo which disrupted
the electric power grid in early 2018 (cf. Hopkins & Pérez-
Peña, 2018; Interview F, I). Consequently, EnC members
have an underdeveloped culture to coordinate and voice
their collective interests, and generally accept the design
of energy regulation from Brussels (Interview F, K, L).
Ex-post influence of contracting parties has slowly in-
creased: from the transposition of regulation without
changes, via small adaptations reflecting the institutional
framework of the EnC, to recent developments poten-
tially enabling substantive customization. Although the
EnC Treaty has always provided for customization (Arti-
cle 24 lays down that the situation of each contracting
party must be considered when making changes to the
EnC Treaty), this ability has never been used. One rea-
son is that EnC members welcomed the rigid copy-paste
transplantation because it promised the establishment
of a functioning legal and institutional framework within
their territories (Interview F, L). Only lately has Brussels’
one-size-fits-all approach to EU rule export across the
EnC provoked calls for more flexibility (cf. Buschle, 2014,
p. 18). EnC members have developed self-confidence in
pronouncing their idiosyncrasies and have started voic-
ing them through alliances with one another. The EU has
signalled openness for change. Internally, it has been ex-
periencing a parallel development, turning away from
a rigid system of top-down imposition towards pursu-
ing energy and climate goals through nuanced member
state contributions. An expansion of this model to non-
members would necessarily consider national character-
istics (Interview L). In 2014, a reform process of the EnC
Treaty was initiated to address the challenges of the
agreement. TheHigh-Level ReflectionGroup, set up to re-
view the effectiveness of the agreement, proposed flexi-
bility in the implementation process to adapt EU rules to
the socio-economic situation of contracting parties (EnC,
2014, pp. 11–13). The reform process, which is entering
its final phase, could thus entail institutionalized oppor-
tunities for legal customization similar to those of the
EEA (Interview L).
3.2. Switzerland: A Shaper at the Crossroads
Switzerland has access to EU policy deliberations despite
not being part of the EEA. Although the bilateral agree-
ments between Switzerland and the EU do not cover en-
ergy yet, several institutional arrangements exist in this
field. Switzerland is regularly involved in the informal
meetings of EU energy ministers as an observer but does
not have access to the EU Energy Council and its prepara-
tory bodies (Interview C). Swiss officials may also partic-
ipate in some expert group meetings of the European
Commission (e.g., Gas Coordination Group) as well as
in European regulatory forums, including electricity (Flo-
rence) and gas (Madrid) (Lavenex, 2015, p. 34). The Swiss
national regulatory authority, ElCom, has signed aMemo-
randum of Understanding with ACER granting it observer
status in the organization’s Electricity Working Group (In-
terview A, D). The Swiss electricity TSO, Swissgrid, is a
full member of ENTSO-E; the Swiss gas TSOs are associ-
ated members or observers of ENTSO-G. The prevalent
observer status does not preclude Swiss influence be-
cause in most of these forums expertise and deliberation
are more important than formal voting (Interview D, I).
Switzerland’s future access to European institutions de-
pends on the conclusion of an electricity agreement that
it has been negotiating with the EU since 2007 (Inter-
view I, J). These negotiations have been severely affected
by disagreements on the broader institutional framework
between both parties, especially following a Swiss refer-
endum decision in 2014 to limit immigration from the EU
(Hettich, Walther, & Schreiber Tschudin, 2015).
Switzerland has a relatively high level of structural
power resources. Its electricity trade relationship with
the EU is one of mutual dependence with net exports
to the EU in summer and net imports in winter (SFOE,
2018b). Switzerland is a major transit country for elec-
tricity, especially between Central Europe and Italy. It ac-
counts for 10% of all cross-border electricity flows in con-
tinental Europe and one-fifth of the European intercon-
nector capacity (Marcus et al., 2017, p. 43; Pattupara &
Kannan, 2016, p. 153). Switzerland is an electricity hub
with long-standing expertise in managing transboundary
electricity flows. In the 1950s, its cross-border infrastruc-
turemarked the birth of the European electricity grid. To-
day, Swissgrid is perceived as an active TSO in Central
Europe with a high level of technical knowledge (Inter-
view I, J). Additionally, the Swiss mission to the EU is
made up of two diplomatic positions in the area of en-
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ergy and climate. Finally, its large hydropower capacities
(16 GW) and its highly integrated grid with 41 intercon-
nectors make Switzerland a flexibility provider in the Eu-
ropean electricity system (SFOE, 2018a; Interview B).
These relatively high levels of access and structural
power resources suggest that Switzerland has some ex-
ante influence on EU energy policy. On a technical level,
Switzerland has been able to use its formal access to
shape the work of ENTSO-E in subsidiary legislation (In-
terviewN). The Swiss TSO has notably taken leading roles
in the development of European Network Codes and
Guidelines that are prepared by ENTSO-E for adoption
by ACER and the European Commission (Interview J, K).
Swissgrid’s influence is attributed to its proactive atti-
tude, its technical expertise, and themanagement of key
physical and administrative infrastructures in the Euro-
pean grid (Interview D, I, K). On a political level, Swiss
influence through formal channels has been more lim-
ited. The Swiss national regulatory authority is repeat-
edly excluded from important meetings of ACER and can-
not appeal against decisionswhich adversely affect Swiss
interests. Switzerland is also excluded from activities re-
lated to the EU internal market for electricity, such as the
Cross-Border Intraday Market Project XBID (Interview A).
However, the pressure on Switzerland is somewhat at-
tenuated by the fact that the EU is dependent on Swiss
grid infrastructure for integrating Italy into its flow-based
market coupling (Interview D, J, M, N). Still, the over-
all impression is that Switzerland can use formal access
more readily for shaping technical rather than political
facets of EU energy policy.
Switzerland uploads its preferences to the European
level also through informal channels. It is an observer
in the Pentalateral Forum—an important venue for dis-
cussing electricity matters with all major governance ac-
tors from the Central West Europe market region (Inter-
view C, E). Switzerland’s participation provides it with
early information and opportunities for voicing its con-
cerns to influential EU member states (Interview B, E).
Although not an EU body, the Pentalateral Forum has
repeatedly shaped EU energy policies through its con-
tactswith the European Commission (InterviewB).More-
over, Swiss diplomats have regular bilateral contacts
with energy attachés of neighbouring EU countries who
are important sources of information and susceptible to
Swiss concerns (Interview C). Additionally, shared inter-
ests and the provision of technical knowledge have al-
lowed Switzerland to inject policy positions into EU de-
liberations via Luxembourg (Interview E). The simulta-
neous use of both formal and informal access points
has been particularly effective. For instance, Swiss ac-
tors were able to shape parts of the Electricity Balanc-
ing Guideline to suit them better by articulating a joint
position through various channels (Interview C). Hence,
Switzerland voices and to some extent even successfully
uploads its policy preferences to the European level.
Ex-post influence is currently not relevant for Switzer-
land because it is not legally bound to implement the EU
energy acquis but autonomously adapts to new EU leg-
islation (Marcus et al., 2017, p. 39). Consequently, the
energy laws of Switzerland and the EU take similar strate-
gic directions but differ in various specific aspects (Inter-
view A, D, H). In the future, pressures for stronger Swiss
convergence with the EU energy acquis will rise to the
extent that Switzerland wishes to participate in the EU
internal market for electricity (ACER, 2018, p. 2; Inter-
view D, J). In sum, Switzerland finds itself at a crossroads:
The (non-)conclusion of an institutional and an electricity
agreement with the EUwill affect its Europeanmarket in-
tegration as well as its ability to shape EU energy policy
(cf. also van Baal and Finger, 2019, in this issue).
3.3. Norway: A Reactive Shaper
Norway has been part of the EU’s Single Market through
the EEA Agreement since 1994. The prerequisite is
the implementation of ‘EEA-relevant’ EU legislation, al-
though a veto option exists. Beyond market legislation,
relevance is assessed based on what was previously in-
corporated, and subject to negotiations between the
EU and the EEA countries (Buschle & Jourdan-Andersen,
2016). Norway does not have political representation—
or voting rights—inside the EU institutions and has no
access to the political negotiations on proposed legisla-
tion in the Council or in the European Parliament (Inter-
view G, O). Among EEA members, only Norway as a ma-
jor energy provider holds an annual bilateral energy dia-
loguewith the Commission, which it has since 2002 (Min-
istry of Petroleum and Energy, 2017, p. 4). However, the
EEA countries may collectively comment on Commission
initiatives, and the EEA agreement grants them access to
Commission (comitology) committees. Experts from EEA
countries may also participate as observers in Commis-
sion expert committees andworking groups, as well as in
EU agencies. The latter requires implementation of the
relevant legislation, so the Norwegian energy agency’s
access to observe ACER board meetings remains on hold
due to delays implementing the Third Energy Package
(see below). The Norwegian gas TSO (Gassco) is an ob-
server in ENTSO-G, while the Norwegian electricity TSO
(Statnett) is a full member of ENTSO-E with voting rights
and a high-ranking representative on its board.
In regard to structural power resources, Norway is
the second-largest provider of oil and gas to the EU, con-
tributing 12% of oil and 23% of gas imports (Eurostat,
2018). With minimal domestic gas consumption, Nor-
way has built pipelines exclusively for export to Europe.
Its electricity system is based predominantly on hydro
which provides flexibility to an interconnected Nordic
market. Interconnectors also exist with the Netherlands
and are under construction with Germany and the UK.
Overall, Norway is a net exporter of electricity to the EU.
Finally, Norway has permanent representation in Brus-
sels,with twodiplomatic staffworking on energy (Norwe-
gian Mission, 2018). With early domestic liberalization
and regional integration of electricity, Norwegian public
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and private actors have extensive experience to build on
(Jevnaker, 2014; Interview G, I, O).
Norway uses its access to the Commission to seek ex-
ante influence. Experts from EEA energy ministries and
DG Energy meet to discuss upcoming and adopted EU
legislation, and the Commission is characterized as re-
ceptive to discussing new initiatives (Interview G). While
EEA countries rarely (and never since 2008) submit for-
mal joint comments to the Commission on upcoming en-
ergy legislation (EFTA, 2018), Norway has submitted non-
papers individually as well as jointly with EU member
states (Interview G, see also Szulecki, Fischer, Gullberg,
& Sartor, 2016). Moreover, Norway uses the energy di-
alogue for political talks with the Commission (Jevnaker,
2014, p. 18), most recently in 2016 (Interview G). Nor-
way does not have privileged access to the European
Parliament (Interview G, O), but has been invited to in-
formal Council sessions since 2003. Nordic-Baltic meet-
ings ahead of the formal Council sessions allow Norway
to present its interests to EU member states. Norway
also ensures that it has a meeting with the incoming
Council presidency to inform that member state about
the EEA Agreement (Interview G). Generally, Norwegian
politicians have weak incentives to prioritize informal
channels vis-à-vis the Council due to their inability to
participate in formal sessions or negotiations (Trondal
& Stie, 2015; Interview G). Norwegian experts partici-
pate in comitology committees on energy-related issues
(Jevnaker, 2014, 2016). Although major Norwegian en-
ergy companies and associations are actively engaged in
Brussels (Interview O)—including via EU associations—
they mainly lobby in Norway to influence EU decision-
making processes (Gullberg, 2015). However, Statnett is
a central player due to its expertise and use of resources,
dedicating a large number of staff to, and having experi-
ence with, liberalization and regional energy market in-
tegration (Interview I). Participation without representa-
tion in the EU generally leaves Norway’s management
of its EU relations to the administration (Trondal & Stie,
2015), with weak political impetus behind Norwegian
use of available channels for ex-ante influence.
Regarding ex-post influence, EEA incorporation of the
energy acquis is subject to negotiation, where adjust-
ments represent a form of customization. Moreover, not
all EU energy legislation is relevant to the EEA. For in-
stance, the Common European Facility, which also funds
energy infrastructure, was defined as a budget issue
which is outside the scope of the EEA Agreement. In
practice, whether an act is classified as EEA relevant or
not involves some political discretion that can be ex-
ploited through good reasoning (Interview G). Never-
theless, Norwegian arguments carried additional weight
due to Norway’s strategic energy assets. Norway has
resisted most EU legislation on offshore issues to pro-
tect its petroleum sector, disputing relevance on grounds
that its continental shelf—where petroleum extraction
takes place—is outside the EEA’s geographical jurisdic-
tion (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 13).
Outright rejection of EEA-relevant legislation has occa-
sionally been discussed in Norway (for energy: the 1994
licensing directive, the 1998 gas market directive, and
the 2009 ACER Regulation), but a formal veto has never
been effectuated (NOU, 2012, p. 103). Instead, the EU
and the EEA countries have negotiated on adjustments
and derogations for specific articles in difficult EU energy
legislation prior to EEA incorporation, for instance, decid-
ing on a lower renewables target for Norway than was
anticipated from the EU’s methodology (Jevnaker, 2016).
Negotiations on adjustments are sometimes linked to dis-
cussions on EEA relevance and a potential veto, whereby
resistance and disagreements can prolong the process.
EEA incorporation needs unanimous support from the
EEA countries (Buschle & Jourdan-Andersen, 2016), so
delays in one country prevent application everywhere.
At the time of writing, the Third Energy Package of
2009 was still awaiting Icelandic parliamentary approval.
Finally, EEA countries can customize implementation
where there is flexibility in EU legislation. On energy, Nor-
way used this option to uphold domestic practices, for
example, reinforcing public ownership when EU legisla-
tion banned the differential treatment of public and pri-
vate ownership in licensing contracts on energy (Austvik
& Claes, 2011).
4. Comparing Followers and Shapers
This section discusses the findings of the empirical case
studies in light of our conceptual framework. The cases
exhibit very different degrees of ex-ante influence. Lack-
ing access to relevant venues and actors, the EnC plays
no active role in EU policy-making. Where there is only
weak potential for formal or informal access, low struc-
tural power often impedes the exploitation of these
channels. Switzerland makes more and effective use of
its formal access to certain European bodies, in partic-
ular to ENTSO-E where it successfully draws on its ex-
pertise to influence the technical aspects of EU regula-
tion. It also actively utilizes informal channels to upload
its preferences on political aspects of EU energy legis-
lation. Among our cases, Norway has the most access
and possesses sufficient structural power resources to
exploit it. As for Switzerland, expertise and capacity gen-
erate leverage in European bodies such as ENTSO-E. Nev-
ertheless, Norway’s influence is somewhat compromised
by the lack of attention given to the matter by its politi-
cians, which has largely left Norwegian engagement vis-
à-vis the EU to bureaucrats and stakeholders.
In all case studies, a clear distinction was found be-
tween influence over political as compared to more ad-
ministrative and technical policy-making. The political
venues in the EU (the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil) are mainly off limits to the third countries studied
here. By contrast, the more technical and administra-
tive venues for the development of EU subsidiary legisla-
tion (European Commission working groups, ACER, and
the ENTSOs) are more amenable to third countries. Strik-
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ingly, the ex-ante influence of third countries here may
even surpass that of certain EU member states. In this
context, an EU official involved in high-level EU energy
policy-making stated that “the de-facto power and rep-
resentation of Switzerland without voting rights is many
times higher than a small Eastern European member
state with voting rights” (Interview J, own translation).
Our analysis suggests that this assessment may be ex-
tended to Norway. Nevertheless, while the case studies
indicate instances of influence during policy-making, an
investigation of the relative impact on adopted legal acts
exceeds the scope of this analysis.
An assessment of ex-post influence on EU energy pol-
icy through customization revealed diversity across the
cases. Empirical evidence suggests a link between access
and structural power on one hand and ex-post influence
on the other hand. Essentially copy-pasting the EU en-
ergy acquis, the EnC has long been a prime example of
top-down Europeanization of third countries. Only lately
did the contracting parties signal interest to move to-
wards a more balanced relationship. A model could be
the EEA, which despite an obligation to adopt relevant
EU energy legislation grants its members some scope
for negotiated adjustments. This requires reasoned argu-
mentation, which may carry more weight if the country
possesses structural power—such as Norway. Still, even
Norway is not always granted adjustments. In contrast,
Switzerland does not need ex-post influence because it
is not legally required to transpose EU energy legislation
and autonomously adapts to it instead. In practice, Swiss
energy policy takes similar strategic directions to EU leg-
islation but deviates in its substantive provisions.
Among the three cases, Switzerland enjoys the
largest leeway for formulating an energy policy that con-
siders domestic needs. This is not surprising given the
bilateral framework for cooperation with the EU which
does not entail automatic law export in either direction.
Nevertheless, the bilateral path to energy sector integra-
tion has become increasingly cumbersome for the EU
(cf. Buschle, 2014). The difficulties experienced when try-
ing to conclude an electricity agreement with Switzer-
land suggest that multilateral agreements may better
suit EU interests. From a Brussels perspective, the mul-
tilateral model promises economies of scale, since it fa-
cilitates the export of EU law to more than one coun-
try. A functioning framework can also attract other third
countries to join the agreement. Moreover, the two mul-
tilateral frameworks currently in place have shown that
integration does not have to come at the price of rigid-
ity: customization as already practised in the EEA—and
as discussed in the reform process of the EnC—can pro-
vide for at least some flexibility. This corresponds to the
idea of a modern, goal-oriented form of governance that
accommodates diversity and integrates heterogeneous
countries into a single legal space.
This diversity is reflected in the different roles that
individual countries may play in relation to EU energy
policy-making (see Table 3). Among our cases, both Nor-
way and Switzerland are shapers of EU energy policy.
They can upload their preferences to the European level
thanks to their access to relevant policy venues and ac-
tors and their relatively high structural power resources.
These countries have a particular status in relation to the
EU,making themmore than ‘pure’ third countries.While
Norway ranks higher on both variables, it ismainly a reac-
tive shaper as it uses most of its influence in the ex-post
stage. Switzerland is a shaper of EU energy policy formu-
lation but presently finds itself at a crossroads. Failure to
achieve an electricity agreement with the EU will likely
come at the expense of market and political access (In-
terview J). Switzerland is thus at risk of losing its shaper
role. The EnC is a follower and despite the differences in
structural power resources among itsmembers (six coun-
tries from the Western Balkans, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine), all of them fall short of being shapers. The EnC
reform process is unlikely to change this.
Future research could locate other third countries
within this framework. Tentatively (marked in Table 3
in brackets), we assume that Russia’s high structural
power (oil and gas supplier) and comparatively low ac-
cess (Energy Dialogue) make it an almost ideal typical
challenger. As an important transit country within the
EU’s strategy to diversify supply routes (Southern Gas
Corridor), Turkey also falls within this category. The low
structural power of Belarus (transit country bypassed by
Ukraine and Nord Stream) and its lack of access render
it an outsider. Iceland, with a fair degree of access (EEA)
yet low structural power (energy island), is a follower.
Table 3. Third country roles in EU energy policy.
Third Country Access
Absent Present





Low (Belarus) EnC members
(Iceland)
Note: Compiled by the authors.
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5. Conclusion
In this article, we explored the relative influence of third
countries on EU energy policy. In contrast to one-sided
concepts of Europeanization, we argued that non-EU
member states can indeed exert influence on EU energy
governance. The relative influence of third countries is a
function of their access to relevant EU policy venues and
actors, and their structural power resources. We empir-
ically probed our argument in three case studies which
represented different institutional models of EU–third
country cooperation. We found the nine Southeast and
East European states that are parties to the EnC to be
followers of EU energy policy. Recently, however, they
have voiced demands for greater flexibility in the trans-
position of the energy acquis. By contrast, Switzerland
(bilateral arrangements) and Norway (EEA member) act
as shapers of EU energy policy—althoughwith some limi-
tations: Switzerland currently faces uncertainties regard-
ing its future access to European institutions; Norway has
generally taken a more reactive stance. Nonetheless, we
find it striking that these two non-members are held to
sometimes have even more influence on EU energy pol-
icy than some EU member states with voting rights. Fu-
ture research could examine this further by means of in-
depth case studies of third-country influence in specific
policy processes.
What does our research reveal about the future of
the UK in EU energy governance? Its role will partly de-
pend on access to European institutions. The EU seeks
to avoid giving institutional and market access to third
countries without requiring them to follow EU rules, as
its harsher stance towards Switzerland illustrates. Mod-
els for future EU–UK cooperation could hence be the
electricity agreement between the EU and Switzerland
or the more extensive EEA Agreement. Notwithstand-
ing this choice, the UK is losing important structural
power due to decreasing fossil fuel production and sup-
plies to the EU. Its electricity interconnection with Ire-
land and Continental Europe may matter for the inter-
nal market, but its island position naturally limits tran-
sit functions. The UK could gain some leverage though
through its expertise in energy markets and liberaliza-
tion. Irrespective of what access the UK should get to
the EU via a Brexit agreement, our framework thus pre-
dicts difficulties in exploiting channels of influence. The
UK, therefore, finds itself at a crossroads of its future en-
ergy relations with the Union. If upcoming political deci-
sions led to the loss of British access to most EU policy
venues, the UK could become an outsider according to
our framework.
Brexit is the most obvious reason why systematic re-
search on the role of third countries in EU policy-making
is timely. Our contribution to this emerging research
agenda is to highlight that the Europeanization of energy
policy works in two directions—also with third countries.
The EU regulatory regime is not immune to external in-
fluence. Depending on their access and structural power,
third countries can follow, challenge, and even shape EU
energy policy.
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